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most growth-promoting policies.
Torsten Persson
Director, Institute for International Economic Studies
Stockholm University
S-106 91 Stockholm
SWEDEN
and NBER
torsten.persson@iies.su.se1 Introduction
Research on constitutions and economic policymaking (see e.g., Persson and
Tabellini, 2004, 2003) has drawn on earlier theoretical work to empirically
uncover systematic and quantitatively important eﬀects of both electoral
r u l e sa n df o r m so fg o v e r n m e n to nﬁscal policy and corruption. But, so far,
this research has no more than scratched the surface when it comes to struc-
tural policies related to long-run economic performance. Moreover, ques-
tions remain regarding the causal interpretations of the empirical ﬁndings:
the paucity of deep constitutional reforms within the set of democracies has
led researchers to estimate the constitutional eﬀects from the cross-sectional
variation in the data.
Research on long-run economic development (see e.g., Hall and Jones,
1999, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi, 2004) has found clusters of structural polices in regulation and trade
to be essential for economic performance; it has also found those structural
policies to be systematically shaped by history and geography. (Many papers
in this literature use the label “institutions”, where I use “structural policies”,
see Section 2 for further discussion). While this work supports the common
notion that "good institutions are necessary for successful development", it
remains obscure which deep societal institutions, if any, lead to the adoption
of growth-promoting policies. Moreover, this research program, as well, has
based its empirical estimates on the cross-sectional patterns in the data.
Indeed, the ﬁndings have been criticized as ambiguous or fragile by Glaeser
et al (2004), among others.
In this paper, I combine insights from these two recent research programs
to extend the empirical analysis of the political economy of development. In
terms of substance, my main claim is that speciﬁc political arrangements —
the form of democracy, rather than democracy (vs. non-democracy) per se —
may be one of the missing links between history, current policy and economic
development. This claim, in turn, brings together two ideas based on the
aforementioned results: (1) If constitutional arrangements indeed shape ﬁscal
policy and corruption, they are likely to be reﬂected also in the structural
polices fostering economic development, such as property-rights preserving
regulations and non-protectionist trade policies. (2) If history and culture
2indeed shape important societal institutions, they are likely to be reﬂected
in the design of political institutions, such as the form of government or the
electoral system.
In terms of methodology, I build further on an approach initiated in
Persson (2004) to overcome the stumbling block that we observe few reforms
among established democracies deep enough to change their broad consti-
tutional features. By including democracies as well as non-democracies in
the sample, I can separate the eﬀects of democracy as such, from the eﬀects
of the form of democracy. Speciﬁcally, I exploit more than 130 observed
switches in and out of democracy in the last forty years, which are associ-
ated with diﬀerent forms of democracy. These reforms allow me to estimate
various (multiple) treatment eﬀects from the within-country variation in the
outcomes of interest. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) also study the time vari-
ation around democratic reforms for a number of economic policy outcomes,
but do not distinguish diﬀerent forms of democracy.
The next section of the paper relies on a cross-sectional data set with av-
erage outcomes from the 1990s in about 100 countries. I start by describing
the structural policy and performance data and reviewing recent work in the
macro development literature by a replication — in spirit — of the results in
Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Next,
Im a k ea nap r i o r icase of why we should expect the form of democracy to
inﬂuence structural policies. Against this backdrop, I introduce a number
of constitutional measures as prospective determinants of structural policy.
Then, I present a set of instrumental-variable estimates, showing that par-
liamentary (as opposed to presidential) democracy as well as the age of
democracy, have a strong positive impact on economic performance through
structural policy. Finally, I show that the estimates of the eﬀects on struc-
tural policy hold up when I instrument the form of democracy by birth dates
of the current (democratic) constitutions and by the Acemoglu et al measure
of settler mortality.
The third section proceeds to a panel data set with annual observa-
tions during the period 1960-2000 in up to 140 countries. Here, I present
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect on policy outcomes based on
exits and entries into diﬀerent forms of democracy (and a few reforms of
existing democracies). Because the cross-sectional results in Section 2 show
the age of democracy to be crucial, I distinguish permanent and temporary
(reversed in the sample) democratic reforms; in general, permanent reforms
have the stronger eﬀect on policy. Reforms introducing parliamentary forms
3of government, as in the cross-sectional data, positively aﬀect the liberal-
ization of trade and the protection of private property rights. Now, also
reforms into proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) democratic elections
have similar, but smaller, eﬀects. Robust eﬀects on economic performance
are harder to ﬁnd. A possible explanation is that reforms into parliamen-
tary democracy (from presidential democracy or non-democracy) not only
alter structural polices, but also signiﬁcantly expand government spending.
Indeed, the estimates I obtain from the time-series variation in government
spending are close to the estimates obtained by Persson and Tabellini (2003,
2004) from the cross-sectional variation in 80 democracies.
Taken together, the results in the paper constitute a counterexample to
the claim in Glaeser et al (2004) that it is hard to ﬁnd tangible (i.e., rules-
based) measures of institutions that are systematically correlated with struc-
tural policy measures. The coincidence of the cross-sectional and time-series
results suggest that the estimated eﬀects of parliamentary vs. presidential
form of democracy reﬂect not only correlation, but a causal mechanism.
The paper ends with a few remarks on future research.
2 History, forms of democracy, structural pol-
icy and economic development
In this section, I will argue that we should expect the form of democracy to
inﬂuence growth-promoting policies, and that the (cross-sectional) data in-
deed seems to support this argument. Before doing so, however, I undertake a
small exercise of replication to introduce the data on policy and performance,
and to illustrate some results in the existing macro development literature.
The results from this exercise also serve as a stepping stone for the main
argument.
2.1 Replicating earlier results
It is theoretically plausible and intuitively appealing to expect certain gov-
ernment undertakings to be particularly important for long-run economic
performance. Those would include the design of a regulatory environment
providing wide protection of property rights to promote accumulation of
capital, human capital or productive knowledge, and the design of a non-
protectionist trade regime permitting appropriate price signals to promote
4eﬃcient resource allocation. The recent literature in the macroeconomics of
development has indeed focused precisely on such "institutions" (Hall and
Jones 1999 use the term “social infrastructure”, Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2004, refer to "economic institutions", while Rodrik, Subrama-
nian and Trebbi, 2004, just say “institutions”). I much prefer the label
"structural policy" to emphasize that regulatory and trade regimes result
from purposeful collective choices under a set of more fundamental political
arrangements (this is in line with the argument in Glaeser et al, 2004).
To make close contact with this recent development literature, I adopt
several of the measures used there. Thus, I deﬁne a measure of structural
policy, following Hall and Jones (1999) deﬁnition of "social infrastructure".
As did these authors, I use an (unweighted) average of two indexes. One
(collected by ICRG) refers to government anti-diversion policy, related to
the protection of private property rights. The other index (originally con-
structed by Sachs and Warner, 1995) refers to the number of years with open
borders since 1950. The two indexes, and thus the overall structural policy
index, are normalized to take on values between 0 and 1.1 Compared to Hall
and Jones, however, I consider more recent data, computing an average for
annual outcomes in the 1990s rather than a single year in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, I do not impute data to replace missing observations. (The
Data Appendix expands on sources and deﬁnitions of the variables.)
Economic performance is measured in three ways. I mainly consider (the
log of) output per worker, but I also consider (the log of) TFP. The measure-
ment of these variables again follow Hall and Jones, albeit with more recent
data and no imputed observations. Finally, I consider GDP per capita,o b -
tained directly from the Penn Tables.
The properties of these data might be best illustrated by a scatterplot,
which will be familiar to many readers. Figure 1s h o w sas t r o n gp o s i t i v e
partial correlation between output per worker and structural policy,w h e n
continental location and identity of colonial powers are held constant. The
slope of the regression line in the diagram — which is just above 2 — coincides
with the coeﬃcient on structural policy in an OLS regression of output per
capita (also including the set of continent and colonial history indicators).
However, this positive correlation could reﬂect inﬂuences in each or both
directions.
1In the next subsection, I argue why it makes sense to look at a broad index of diﬀerent
policies rather than some single policy measure.
5To get at the causal relationship between these variables, Hall and Jones
(1999) launched the general idea that societies are more likely to pursue
growth-promoting structural policies, the more strongly they have been ex-
posed to Western European inﬂuence — for historical or geographical reasons.
They suggested four instruments for a country’s structural policy: its lati-
tude, its predicted trade from geographical and population characteristics,
and its current population shares with a European language, and English,
respectively, as their mother tongue.
Table 1 reports the results from similar two-stage estimates of the ef-
fect of structural policy on output per worker (estimating by GMM means
allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form). When I control for conti-
nental location and identity of prior colonial powers, including latitude and
the fraction of English speakers in the speciﬁcation violates the conventional
relevance or exogeneity test for instruments. As shown in the table, however,
the share of European speakers and more favorable conditions for trade pass
these validity tests: the F-statistic in column 1 rejects irrelevance, and the
chi-2 statistic in column 2 does not reject exogeneity of one of these instru-
ments. By the ﬁrst-stage estimates in column 1, these variables are clearly
positively associated with better structural policy. And by the second-stage
estimates in column 2, structural policy has a large, positive, and precisely
estimated eﬀect on performance. According to these estimates, an improve-
ment in structural policy corresponding to one standard deviation in the
sample (in a country drawn at random) would raise long-run productivity by
about 150%.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) took this kind of argument fur-
ther, by using data on settler mortality in 19th century colonies to measure
the Western European inﬂuence. They argued that investment in ”good
institutions” was less intensive in places with a more dangerous disease envi-
ronment, that good institutions are long-lasting, and that they are conducive
to good policy (policy, in terms of my labeling conventions) today. What
happens when we run the same speciﬁcation as in columns 1 and 2 in the
smaller (about 60 observations) cross section, where the settler mortality data
is available? As columns 3 and 4 show, the results from the larger sample
hold up, except that the predicted trade share has less inﬂuence of structural
policies. If anything, the eﬀect of structural policies on productivity is now
larger. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 (the log of) settler mortality is used
as the sole instrument for structural policy to more convincingly isolate ex-
ogenous variation in policy. The eﬀect of structural policy on performance is
6still precisely estimated, and even larger than before.
These kinds of results certainly strengthen the presumption that broad
clusters of structural policies on regulation and trade do shape long-run eco-
nomic performance. But a large question remains: under which speciﬁc
political arrangements, if any, are we more likely to observe the adoption of
more growth-promoting polices? This is the main issue of the present paper,
to which I now turn.
2.2 Do forms of democracy shape structural policy and
economic performance?
Preliminaries Why should the nature of constitutional arrangements, i.e.,
the form of democracy, systematically inﬂuence the adoption of growth-
promoting structural policies? From a theoretical perspective, the beneﬁts
of property rights regulation for diﬀerent groups in society depends on the
design and enforcement of the underlying legislation. But arguably, the reg-
ulation is more conducive to accumulation and growth when its protection of
private property rights extends, in a relatively undiscriminating way, to broad
groups of the population, rather than to small privileged groups or elites (see
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004, for such an argument). A similar
argument can be made for the trade regime. Protectionist trade policies sup-
port certain sectors, but sectors of production and regions of residence often
correlate well, particularly in developing countries. Non-protectionist trade
policies thus also tend to yield beneﬁts to broad groups in the population,
rather than small groups targeted by sector or region. In regulation as well as
trade, stable policies are likely to have a larger eﬀect than unstable policies
on accumulation and allocation.
Given this characterization of growth-promoting structural policy in terms
of the distribution of their beneﬁts, we obtain some insights from the recent
theoretical work on constitutions and ﬁscal policy. One is that we should ex-
pect certain arrangements to better promote policies with broad and stable
beneﬁts. Existing models of the form of government predict that the conﬁ-
dence requirement inherent in parliamentary systems helps produce spending
programs better serving broad and stable majorities of voters than programs
in presidential systems (see Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). Models of
alternative electoral rules predict proportional elections to produce polices
better serving the interests of broad majorities than do majoritarian elec-
7tions, either directly through incentives of politicians, or indirectly via party
formation and the incidence of coalition government (see Lizzeri and Persico,
2001, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 2002, Persson and Tabellini,
1999, 2000, and Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2003). Another insight from
t h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r ei st h a ts y s t e m a t i ce ﬀects of alternative democratic ar-
rangements should not only show up in single programs, but in a number
of policy programs. This means that it becomes natural to consider clus-
ters of policies, like the structural policy index considered in the previous
subsection.
Motivated by this discussion, I deﬁne binary indicators for democracy and
its various forms, using the classiﬁcations in Persson and Tabellini (2003,
2004). If a country, on average, is coded as at least semi-free by the sur-
veys of Freedom House (its Gastil index is lower than 5), I set the indicator
democracy =1 . 2 Among democracies, countries are coded as parliamentary
(parliamentary democracy =1 ,presidential democracy = 0) if their executive
is subject to a conﬁdence agreement, presidential if it is not. And democ-
racies are coded as majoritarian if their elections to the lower house of the
legislature rely on plurality rule (proportional democracy =0 ,majoritarian
democracy = 1), proportional if they do not.
In addition to these binary indicator variables, I also follow Persson and
Tabellini (2003) and measure the age of a country’s democracy. The rationale
for including this variable among the prospective policy determinants is that
the stability argument above may not only apply to policy choices given a
set of political institutions, but also to those institutions themselves. The
variable age of democracy measures the number of years with uninterrupted
democratic rule, going backwards from 2000 to 1800, divided by 200. It thus
takes on values between 0 and 1 among democracies, and a value of 0 for all
non-democracies.
I now ask whether these indicators help explain structural policy and
performance. Persson and Tabellini (2003, ch. 7) took some steps towards
answering this question. Here, I extend that analysis by using more recent
observations, diﬀerent speciﬁcations and estimation techniques and by adding
non-democracies to the sample. In Section 3 below, I also consider panel data.
2Another source for the classiﬁcation of democracies and non-democracies, which I
exploit in the panel data considered below, is the PolityIV data set. While the Polity
data is better suited for the study of democratic reforms over time, the Freedom House
data has broader coverage, as it also includes data on smaller countries not covered by the
Polity data.
8In the present section, I pose two questions to the cross-sectional data: (i)
Are the indicators for constitutional rules signiﬁcantly related to structural
policy, while exogenous to output per worker (TFP, GDP per capita)i na
statistical sense? (ii) Are the constitutional rules plausible links from history
to current policy?
Constitutions, policy and performance To answer question (i), I add
my constitutional measures as instruments, alongside the two Hall and Jones
instruments, in the earlier two-stage speciﬁcation. In other words, I adopt
the speciﬁcation illustrated in Figure 2, where the constitution aﬀects per-
formance only through its eﬀect on structural policy (note that I am still
controlling for continental location and identity of colonial rulers). The par-
liamentary form of government indicator and the age of democracy variable
always turn out to be signiﬁcant determinants of structural policy. As long
as these two indicators are included, however, the indicator for presidential
democracy (or democracy as such), never signiﬁcantly inﬂuences structural
policy. Neither do the indicators for alternative systems of democratic elec-
tions.
Results for the full 1990s cross section appear in the ﬁrst portion of Table
2. Columns 1 and 2 show the ﬁrst and second stage GMM estimates, when
the parliamentary democracy and age of democracy variables are added to the
corresponding ﬁrst-stage speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 1. Several points
about these results are worth noting. The two Hall and Jones instruments
retain their explanatory power. But parliamentary democracy and age of
democracy also inﬂuence structural policy in the expected direction — i.e.,
towards better policies. These variables also add enough explanatory power
to the ﬁrst stage for the F-statistic for the excluded instruments to remain
at the same level as in column 1 of Table 1 (10.50 vs. 11.01). The estimated
eﬀect of structural policy on output per worker in column 2 is also stable
relative to its earlier estimate in column 2 of Table 1 (3.59 vs. 3.81). Due
to the overidentiﬁcation, we can test the speciﬁc hypothesis that the two
constitutional variables are exogenous to output per worker. The C-statistic
(based on the diﬀerence between two Sargan statistics) at the bottom of
column 2, is safely within the acceptance region.
According to the estimates, the constitutional eﬀects are substantial in
magnitude. Under the maintained exogeneity assumption, introducing par-
liamentary democracy in a non-democracy — or, equivalently (as the presi-
9dential democracy indicator is insigniﬁcant), in a presidential democracy —
improves structural policy so as to raise long-run productivity by almost 50%.
Columns 3 and 4 show that we obtain the same qualitative results if
output per worker is replaced by GDP per capita,o rb yTFP. In the latter
case, the estimated coeﬃcient on structural policy is cut in half, which is
not surprising given that the TFP measure controls for the accumulation of
physical and human capital, whereas the other two do not.
Finally, columns 5 through 8 of the table show that the results hold
up equally or more strongly in the smaller settler mortality sample. As in
columns 1-2, the estimates in columns 5-6 are comparable to the correspond-
ing estimates in Table 1.
History, constitutions and policy At a minimum, the estimates in Ta-
ble 2 show that the form of democracy is systematically correlated with
structural policies (and, indirectly with economic performance). They thus
provide a clear counterexample to the argument in Glaeser et al (2004) that
it is hard to ﬁnd any measures of societal institutions, in the forms of tangible
rules and procedures which are correlated with current measures of growth-
promoting policies. The estimates also suggest that earlier failures to ﬁnd
robust eﬀects of political regimes on economic development (see e.g., Prze-
worski and Limongi, 1993 for an overview) may have considered too crude
measures, namely democracy vs. non-democracy.3
The results support the ﬁrst main idea behind the paper, mentioned in
the introduction, namely that the systematic eﬀects on ﬁscal policy may also
extend to other areas of policymaking. But can we interpret the estimates
as reﬂecting a causal mechanism? For doing so, the constitutional variables
should not be endogenous to structural policy or economic performance. The
statistical arguments for exogeneity in the previous subsection may be reas-
suring, but they are clearly not enough. It is therefore useful to turn to the
other main idea behind the paper, namely that historical forces may indeed
exercise their impact on current polices through constitutional arrangements.
To shed light on this possibility, I turn to an instrumental-variable strategy
based on ap r i o r iarguments.
Let us make the assumption that Western colonization aﬀects current
policies only (mainly) via the form of political institutions. Inﬂuence of
3See, however, the recent paper by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004) for more positive
results.
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arrangements we observe post independence. Speciﬁcally, greater Western
inﬂuence should show up in a greater probability of observing the same type
of political arrangements in previous colonies as those observed in Western
Europe, i.e., stable parliamentary democracies. Now suppose, in line with
Acemoglu et al, that settler mortality is a good measure of Western inﬂu-
ence. Under the identifying assumption that the inﬂuence on current policies
operates only via the form of political institutions, settler mortality becomes
a valid instrument for parliamentary democracy and/or age of democracy.
To achieve overidentiﬁcation, I also use two additional historical instru-
ments for constitutional arrangements. These are constructed and motivated
in detail by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004). They exploit diﬀerent world-
wide frequencies in the adoption of alternative constitutional features during
diﬀerent historical periods. Speciﬁcally, the indicator constitutional birth 51-
80 is set to 1 if a country is democratic and its present electoral rule or form
of government was introduced in the period 1951-80, and to 0 otherwise;
constitutional birth 21-50 is deﬁned accordingly with regard to the period
1921-50.
Based on these arguments I adopt an estimation strategy that delves
deeper than the ﬁrst-stage estimates in Table 2, by treating political ar-
rangements as endogenous when assessing their impact on current policies.
The strategy is illustrated in Figure 3. I still control for the identity of the
colonizing power and continental location, and allow the share of European
speakers and the predicted trade share to inﬂuence both structural policy
and constitutional arrangements.
The two-stage (GMM) estimates are displayed in Table 3. In the ﬁrst two
columns, I treat parliamentary democracy as endogenous, and age of democ-
racy as exogenous. As expected a priori, the likelihood of parliamentary
democracy is reduced by less Western inﬂuence, i.e., higher settler mortality,
and raised by constitutional birth in the early post-war period. A change
in the form of government is estimated to have about double the eﬀect on
structural policy as the one estimated in Table 2. Moreover, by the chi-2
statistic at the bottom of column 2, we cannot reject the assumption that
settler mortality only aﬀects structural policy indirectly, through parliamen-
tary democracy. In columns 3 and 4, the roles of age of democracy and
parliamentary democracy are reversed. The results are similar: more West-
ern inﬂuence improves structural policy by raising the age of democracy,
a n dw ec a n n o tr e j e c tt h a tt h i si n d i r e c te ﬀect is the only eﬀect. In the last
11two columns of Table 3, I treat both constitutional features as endogenous.
Here, I add the second of the constitutional birth variables to obtain separate
identiﬁcation of the two endogenous variables and to maintain overidentiﬁ-
cation. While this last speciﬁcation asks quite a bit of the data, the eﬀect
on structural policy of parliamentary democracy appears robust.
The cross-sectional results in this section are certainly suggestive, but
skeptics may still suspect them to be driven by unobservable (and thus omit-
ted) country-characteristics, or some other statistical artefact. I will address
some of these concerns in the next section by estimating how the form of
democracy aﬀects policy exclusively from the within-country variation as-
sociated with democratic reforms. The result that older democracies have
better policies suggests that it may be important to distinguish democratic
reforms not only by constitutional arrangement but also by duration.
3 Democratic reforms and policy changes
I now turn to a panel data set to estimate how diﬀerent types of democratic
reforms alter economic policy outcomes, and economic performance. Before
going through the results, I describe this data set and my empirical strategy.
3.1 Data and empirical strategy
Reforms in the post-war panel The data set collects annual observa-
tions of political and economic variables from 1960 to 2000 for as many coun-
tries in the world as possible. Due to data availability and the formation of
new countries, the resulting panel is unbalanced — some of the estimates
are still based on data from nearly 140 countries. As already mentioned in
the introduction, and discussed at length in Persson and Tabellini (2003),
reforms broad enough to change the main constitutional features are very
rare among existing democracies (according to the deﬁnition below). This
is evident from the list of such reforms in Table 4 (a). In fact, only two
countries in the panel changed status from a parliamentary to a presidential
form of government, namely Cyprus in 1970 and Sri Lanka in 1978. Switches
between majoritarian and proportional elections with maintained democratic
status occur in about 15 cases, including France in 1986 and 1988, Japan in
1994, New Zealand in 1996, and South Africa in 1994. But these electoral re-
forms are still too few to permit meaningful estimation of the time variation
12associated with reform.
Therefore, I also exploit switches of democratic status to study the eﬀect
of alternative forms of democracy. A ﬁrst requirement is a precise classiﬁ-
cation of countries and years into democratic and non-democratic. In the
panel, I rely on the Polity2 index, included in the 4th wave of the Polity
data set, which is collected for all independent nations with more than 1/2
million inhabitants.4 The Polity2 index takes on values from -10 to +10 de-
pending on a variety of institutional features ranging from constraints on the
executive to the openness of elections. I code a country as democratic in any
year when this index takes on a (strictly) positive value: i.e., I set the binary
indicator democracy =1 .
By this classiﬁcation, a reform occurs in a year of the panel when a na-
tion’s democracy indicator ﬂips between 0 and 1 or vice versa. (Note that a
country that becomes independent within the sample period is coded as miss-
ing before independence, so a reform only occurs if democratic status changes
at some point after the year of independence.) This deﬁnition of reform may
appear quite arbitrary and based on marginal changes in democratic status.
In fact, most reforms accord with conventional views on political history.
They also appear to represent major institutional change: the reforms in-
volve an average jump of 8.5 on the 21-step Polity2 scale (with a standard
deviation of 4.1). To be meaningfully used in the before-after analysis to
follow, I require that the outcome of interest be observed for at least two
years before and after the reform.
Given this exclusion of the two ﬁrst and last years, the maximal number
of switches in and out of democracy I can exploit in the sample are 132.
Missing observations of the variables of interest may cut the number further,
but the typical regression below still incorporates well beyond 100 such re-
form episodes. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 (b) lists the countries and years
of usable reforms. As shown by column 3 of the table, 55 reforms represent
exits out of democracy, while 77 represent entries into democracy. The next
two columns classify the reforms with regard to the form of democracy, re-
4The 1/2 million limit of the Polity data excludes some small nations included in the
Freedom Hourse data used in the previous section. On the other hand, diﬀerent waves of
the Polity data set update the entire data set (back to 1800) as deﬁnitions change, which
makes it more suitable for comparisons over time than the Freedom House data (where
there are no such updates from each yearly coding to the next).
13lying on exactly the same deﬁn i t i o n sa si nt h ep r e v i o us section. Of the 131
episodes with available data (Benin in the early 1960s is hard to classify),
52 involve reforms of parliamentary democracies and 79 reforms of presiden-
tial democracies. With regard to the electoral system, 67 reforms concern
proportional and 64 majoritarian democracies. As is evident from the table,
some countries go through more than one reform. The form of democracy
almost always stays constant across these intermittent periods of democracy,
however, with the exception of six African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda) that start out as parliamentary democra-
cies after independence, and later on reappear as presidential democracies.
I am not only interested in the design of the political system, but also
in the eﬀects of reversible vs. irreversible reforms. To this end, I will de-
ﬁne permanent democracy as the result of reforms within the sample period,
which are not reversed before the end of the panel. Temporary democracy
is instead deﬁned as any state of democracy that ends in the sample. Of all
the reform episodes 82 are associated with the beginning or end of tempo-
rary democracy, whereas 50 are associated with the beginning of permanent
democracy.
Table 5 compares the distribution of covariates in reform episodes across
each of these classiﬁcations. For reforms with exits from (entries into) democ-
racy, the table is based on the pre-reform (post-reform) classiﬁcation. We
see that slightly less than half (frequency 0.46) of the 132 reform country-
years occur in the ﬁrst twenty years of the panel. Reforms into (or out of)
parliamentary vs. presidential democracy have basically the same distribu-
tion over time, as do reforms into proportional vs. majoritarian democracy.
But the table also cautions us that the distribution of democratic reforms
across continents may not be random. In particular, reforms involving presi-
dential and proportional democracy are over-represented in Latin America5,
reforms into majoritarian democracy are over-represented in Africa, while re-
forms into parliamentary and majoritarian democracy are over-represented
in Asia.
The table also compares the reform episodes associated with permanent
and temporary democracies. Naturally, early reforms are more common
among episodes involving temporary democracy than among those involving
5There are no valid reform episodes introducing parliamentary democracy in Latin
America. Some Carabbean countries in the sample are parliamentary democracies, but
they belong to the non-reforming group because they became solid democracies directly
upon independence in the mid 1960s.
14permanent democracy. To some degree, this reﬂects a right-censoring prob-
lem: some reforms classiﬁed as permanent will, in fact, be temporary (i.e.,
reversed after 2000). The incidence of permanent and temporary democracy
is relatively evenly distributed, even though Africa and Asia are somewhat
over-represented in temporary democracy, while Latin America and the rest
of the world are under-represented.
All in all, the incidence of diﬀerent forms of democracy across continents
does not appear to be random across continents. The estimation strategy
should thus avoid confounding this continent-speciﬁc incidence of reforms and
prospective continent-speciﬁc trends in the outcome variables of interest.6
To exploit these reforms in the analysis to follow, I use the information
c o n t a i n e di nT a b l e4t od e ﬁne a new set of binary indicators, always split-
ting the country-years when democracy = 1 into two groups. To analyze
reforms involving diﬀerent democratic forms of government, I thus create
two binary variables: Parliamentary democracy is coded to 1 if democracy
=1 and the form of government is parliamentary, and is coded to 0 other-
wise. And presidential democracy is coded to 1 if democracy =1a n dt h e
form of government is presidential, and to 0 otherwise. Binary indicators for
proportional democracy, majoritarian democracy, permanent democracy, and
temporary democracy are deﬁn e di na na n a l o g o u sm a n n e r .
Econometric speciﬁcation and concerns Consider an outcome variable
y in country i and year t, yit. A basic econometric speciﬁcation can be written
as:
yit =
F X
f=1
β
fD
f
it + αi + υt + uit ,( 1 )
where the D
f
it are the binary indicator variables for a subset of the diﬀerent
forms of democracy discussed above f = 1,..., F . Thus, the parameters
6In the estimates reported below, countries that did not undergo a democratic reform
in the sample period constitute a control group throughout the panel, whether they stayed
democratic or non-democratic throughout. Compared to the countries undergoing at least
one reform, the non-reforming countries on average are richer (but also display more income
dispersion, 15-30% higher standard errors). Moreover, Latin America and Asia are over-
represented in the reform group, whereas the Western world (Europe, North America,
Oceania) is over-represented in the non-reform group. These diﬀerences in observable
covariates indicate that non-observable features may also diﬀer across the two groups; it
is thus important to take account of ﬁxed country characteristics in the analysis.
15of interest are the coeﬃcients β
f. Because the speciﬁcation in (1) includes
ﬁxed country eﬀects (αi), these "treatment eﬀects" are estimated only from
the within-country variation around reforms (changes in D
f
it between 0 and
1, or vice versa). Because it also includes ﬁxed year eﬀects (υt), we obtain
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates: i.e., for countries undertaking a particular
type of reform, we compare the change in y (post-reform minus pre-reform)
with the change in those countries that do not reform (those i that have
either D
f
it =1or D
f
it =0 )o v e rt h es a m ep e r i o d .
This speciﬁcation addresses some problems that may plague cross-sectional
estimates, by holding constant unobserved sources of country variation in y,
which are constant across time, and unobserved sources of time variation in
y, which are common across countries. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcients β
f do
not identify the causal eﬀect of diﬀerent democratic reforms if countries in
the various reform groups have trends in y, which are diﬀerent from those in
the non-reform group but unrelated to reforms.
To give a concrete example, suppose we have a regional component in
m e a s u r e dt r a d ep o l i c y ,i nt h ec o u r s eo ft h es a m p l es a y ,as p e c i ﬁc Latin Ameri-
can trend away from protection towards free trade. This would not be a major
problem if the distribution of countries in the non-reforming group and the
diﬀerent reforms groups were regionally balanced. But, as we saw in Table 5,
Latin-America is over-represented in the reforms involving presidential (and
proportional) democracy. To avoid confounding such regional-speciﬁci n c i -
dence of reform and region-speciﬁc trends in policy or performance, I check
that the estimates of β
f are robust to adding a set of continent-time interac-
tion terms,
P
c γcvt (with γc denoting indicators for diﬀerent continents) to
the speciﬁcation in (1).7
Another concern about identiﬁcation also reﬂects selection into reform on
observables, but of a diﬀerent kind. Reform episodes may not be exogenous
to structural policy or economic performance, because the latter systemati-
cally deteriorate (or improve) in the years just before observed reforms. In
that case, we have a problem analogous to the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip
in the program evaluation literature. It is hard to predict the direction of
this prospective bias ap r i o r i . While it is plausible that economic crises (and
declining performance) may trigger political crises, these may lead to exits
7In the regressions with economic performance measures as dependent variables, I also
add an interaction term between years and socialist legal origin. The idea here is to avoid
confounding democratic reforms and the output fall follwing the breakdown of the Soviet
Union and the fall of the Iron curtain.
16as well as entries with regard to democracy. Nevertheless, we may think that
the policy environment is more unstable in countries introducing temporary
rather than permanent democratic reforms. When it comes to the other clas-
siﬁcations, it is hard to see ap r i o r iwhy we should expect reform episodes
involving diﬀerent forms of government or diﬀerent electoral systems to be
associated with diﬀerent pre-reform changes in structural policies and perfor-
mance. Anyway, I try to check for evidence of systematic pre-reform changes
in the outcome variables amending the speciﬁcation in (1) with the term P
f αfP
f
it,w h e r eP
f
it are indicators for (three) pre-reform years for diﬀerent
type of reforms, f =1 ,..,F. As an additional diagnostic, I also study the
dynamics before (and after) reforms by plots in the style of event studies (see
further below).
A ﬁnal econometric issue concerns inference, rather than identiﬁcation.
Typically, the policies and performance measures I consider below display
quite strong autocorrelation. In these circumstances, the conventional stan-
dard errors associated with diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates can be seriously
understated (see Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan, 2004). To guard against
incorrect inference, I report not only report the conventional standard errors,
but also those obtained by clustering at the country level, thus allowing arbi-
trary country-speciﬁc serial correlation. (This is, arguably, the most conser-
vative way of dealing with the problem discussed by Bertrand et al, 2004.)
3.2 Reforms, policies and performance
Trade liberalization One of the two components of the structural policy
index in Section 2 is the number of years since 1950 with an open economy (in
the sense of low tariﬀs, few non-tariﬀ barriers, small black-market premium,
few state monopolies and a non-socialist economy). I now consider the annual
observations of this openness index, which are available for a large number
of countries for the period 1960-2000 thanks to Wacziarg and Welch’s (2004)
update of Sachs and Warner’s (1995) original data set. For a given country
i and year t, the binary indicator open is thus set equal to 1 or 0, depending
on whether the ﬁve criteria for an open economy are met.
Table 6s h o w st h ed i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of reforms into diﬀer-
ent forms of democracy for this aspect of structural policy. (Estimating the
eﬀect of reforms into democracy, as such, generally yields a positive coeﬃ-
cient, but the signiﬁcance of this eﬀect is not robust to the checks performed
in the table.) These estimates are based on data from 132 countries; due to
17the formation of new countries (mostly) and missing data, the length of the
average panel is 35 years.
Column 1 distinguishes reforms out of non-democracy into (or out of)
democracy with a parliamentary and presidential form of government, re-
spectively. Underneath the estimated coeﬃcients are two sets of standard
errors and the implied conﬁdence levels: conventional ones in parentheses
and clustered (by country) ones in square brackets. The coeﬃcients on both
sets of reforms are positive, but that on presidential democracy is lower and
only borderline signiﬁcant. Clearly, it matters which way the standard errors
are computed: the clustered errors are three to four times higher than the
conventional ones.
Column 2 reports on a speciﬁcation with the robustness checks discussed
in the previous subsection, i.e., continent-year interactions and indicators for
the three years preceding each type of reform. Clearly, the positive eﬀect of
parliamentary reforms is robust to continent-speciﬁct r e n d si nopen. The es-
timated eﬀect is also quantitatively important: introducing a parliamentary
democracy (in a non-democracy or a presidential democracy) raises the prob-
ability of opening the economy by about 25%. There is no robust evidence
of pre-reform changes driving the results.
Figure 4 illustrates the estimates in the form of an event-study plot.
This ﬁgure relies on the residuals from the regression underlying column 2,
but leaving out the democracy indicators. Part (a) of the ﬁgure plots the
(average) residuals associated with entries into and exits out of parliamentary
democracy, ﬁv ey e a r sb e f o r ea n da f t e rr e f o r m .T h e r ei sn os i g no fa n yp r e -
reform changes in liberalization. Moreover, the positive estimates in the
table seem to derive from liberalizations following entries into parliamentary
democracy, rather than de-liberalizations following exits from parliamentary
democracy. Countries opening up their economies within ﬁve years after
their entry into parliamentary democracy include not only some of the former
communistic states in Eastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland
and Romania), but also Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Nepal. Figure 4 (b) shows
a corresponding plot for reforms of presidential democracies. Evidently, the
eﬀects of the presidential reforms are smaller and much less systematic.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report on the same kind of estimates, when
reforms are distinguished by electoral rule. Here, the introduction of democ-
racy with proportional elections (or a reform from majoritarian to propor-
tional elections) raises the probability of an opening of the economy, whereas
the introduction of majoritarian elections does not. Once more, we see no
18evidence of signiﬁcant pre-reform changes in the trade policy index. The pos-
itive eﬀect of proportional elections on openness is about half the estimated
eﬀect of a parliamentary form of government — still quite sizable. Because
the parliamentary-presidential distinction is independent of the proportional-
majoritarian distinction, the speciﬁcations in columns 1-4 really assume the
eﬀects of the form of government and the electoral rule to be additive. A
formal test — based on indicators for the four possible types of democracy —
does not reject the hypothesis of additivity (results not shown).
Finally, columns 5 and 6 consider the distinction between permanent and
temporary reform. As expected, permanent democratizations signiﬁcantly
raise the probability of liberalizing the economy, whereas temporary democ-
ratizations do not. If anything, the latter appear to reduce the probability
of an open economy, but the negative estimate is not statistically robust.
Protection of property rights and structural policy The second com-
ponent of the structural policy measure in Section 2 is the 1990s average of
an index for the protection of property rights, called GADP.W h a ta r et h e
eﬀect of democratic reforms on regulatory policy in broad terms, as measured
by the annual value of this index? The GADP data is only available for a
mere 16 years, however, namely between 1982 and 1997. Given this short
sample period, the distinction between permanent and temporary reforms is
not very meaningful, so that the estimates reported in Table 7 focus on alter-
native forms of government and electoral rules rather than the reversibility
of reform.
Columns 1 and 2 distinguish between parliamentary and presidential
democracies. As in the case of trade liberalization, the eﬀect of parliamen-
tary democracy is estimated to be positive, but when evaluated at the clus-
t e r e ds t a n d a r de r r o r st h ec o e ﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Columns 3 and 4 suggest no discernible eﬀect of the electoral rule.
In columns 5-8 of the table, I carry out the analog of the cross-sectional
speciﬁcation in Section 2. That is, I study the eﬀect of reforms on a broad
Hall-Jones-style measure of structural policy,d e ﬁned as the unweighted av-
erage of open and GADP, for the years and countries where both measures
are available.8 Reforms into parliamentary democracy, as well as propor-
tional democracy, have strong signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on this broad index
8Because of the shorter time span and the stricter data requirements, the number of
reforms underlying the regressions in Table 7 is only about 50.
19of structural policy. Evidently, the two dimensions of policy reinforce each
other: the estimated coeﬃcients for parliamentary democracy and propor-
tional democracy are higher than the average of the individual coeﬃcients
on open (in Table 6) and GADP (in the ﬁrst half of Table 7). Interestingly,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate in Table 7 of the eﬀect of parliamentary
democracy on structural policy just below 0.3. This estimate is close to the
IV estimates in Table 3, where the same eﬀect is entirely identiﬁed from the
cross-country variation, rather than the within-country variation in the data.
This coincidence of the ﬁndings suggests that the estimates indeed pick up a
causal eﬀect of the form of democracy on structural policy.
Economic performance I now consider the eﬀects of reforms on economic
performance. Table 8 displays estimates of the reduced form eﬀects on output
per worker; thus, I do not try to identify the policy channels whereby such ef-
fects — if any — may come about. The table has the same structure as Tables 6
and 7, beginning with distinctions between alternative forms of government,
proceeding via alternative electoral rules to reversibility of reforms. Some of
the estimates in the ﬁrst four columns indicate eﬀects on economic perfor-
mance in line with the estimated eﬀects on structural policy; i.e., positive
eﬀects of reforms introducing parliamentary and proportional democracies.
But these eﬀects are not statistically robust. As we include continent-year
interactions, consider clustered standard errors, or both, they are no longer
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Repeating the same exercise with GDP per
capita or TFP as outcome variables produces similar half-baked results (not
shown).
How can we reconcile these ﬁndings with the panel results for structural
policy and the overall cross-sectional results? I see two possibilities. One is
that the eﬀects on economic performance may only appear with a consid-
erable lag. Not only may the eﬀects of a democratic reform on structural
p o l i c yt a k et i m e .T h ee ﬀects of more growth-promoting polices on produc-
tivity may also take time, because they operate through better incentives
for accumulation and eﬃcient allocation of factors. Since the average demo-
cratic reform in the panel occurs after 1980 (recall Table 5), the eﬀects on
p e r f o r m a n c em a yj u s tn o th a v es h o w nu py e t ,o ra tl e a s tn o ts h o w nu pf u l l y .
The cross-sectional data used in Section 2 may thus allow us to better esti-
mate the long-run eﬀect of democratic reforms on performance, given that
many of the democracies in the sample were created before 1960; recall also
20the positive eﬀects of the age of democracy on policy and performance. In
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis in this section, these older democracies
always belong to the control group of the panel.
The second possibility is that the form of democracy shapes not only
structural policies but also other policies, which aﬀect economic performance
in the opposite direction. In particular, the literature on constitutions and
ﬁscal policy discussed earlier in the paper has found strong support for the
theoretical prediction that parliamentary democracies have larger govern-
ments than presidential democracies. If a large government sector has a
negative eﬀect on economic performance, this may explain the inconclusive
eﬀect on output per worker of parliamentary democracy, despite a favorable
eﬀect on structural policy. Before concluding the paper, I brieﬂyt u r nt ot h i s
possibility.
Government spending For the time period 1960-2000 and the broad set
of countries in the panel, the most widely available measure of government
spending is probably total government consumption (expressed as a percent-
a g eo fG D P )f r o mt h eP e n nW o r l dT a b l e s . Table 9 displays estimates of
how democratic reforms of diﬀerent forms impinge on the size of govern-
ment, measured in that way. As columns 3-6 show, neither the electoral rule
nor the reversibility of reform appear to systematically aﬀect government
consumption. The estimates in columns 1 and 2 are more intriguing, how-
ever. A reform that establishes parliamentary democracy in a non-democracy
raises government spending by about 2.5% of GDP and this eﬀect is quite
precisely estimated. As illustrated by the event-study plot in Figure 5, this
eﬀect reﬂects hikes in spending following entry into parliamentary democracy,
as well as drops in spending following exits from parliamentary democracy.
Additional results (not shown) similarly indicate that this form of democ-
racy creates pressure for more spending: analogous diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates show that reforms introducing parliamentary democracy are also
followed by systematic increases in government deﬁcits and inﬂation.
It is instructive to compare these estimates with those in Persson and
Tabellini (2003, 2004), who only considered cross-sectional data for a set
of democracies and used a very diﬀerent data source (IFS data from the
IMF for total expenditures by central governments). They estimated that
a reform from presidential to parliamentary democracy raises spending by
about 5% of GDP. This is not far from the estimate of 3.3% obtained here,
21when subtracting the coeﬃcient on presidential democracy from that on par-
liamentary democracy in the most general speciﬁcation of column 2. This
coincidence of estimates is remarkable in its own right. But from the view-
point of the present paper, it is consistent with the second suggestion why
we may fail to ﬁnd a robust positive eﬀect of parliamentary democracy on
economic performance.
4F i n a l r e m a r k s
The empirical results in this paper suggest that political arrangements con-
stitute a link in the chain from history to current policy and performance. In
particular, cross-sectional as well as panel data show the form of democracy
to be critical for the design of trade and regulatory regimes. Reforms of au-
thoritarian political regimes into parliamentary, proportional and permanent
democracies seem to foster the adoption of more growth-promoting struc-
tural policies, whereas reforms into presidential, majoritarian and temporary
democracy do not.
Further theoretical work should model the adoption of structural policy
under alternative forms of democracy not only to rationalize the empirical
ﬁndings, but also to generate more insight into the interplay between demo-
cratic arrangements, policy and economic performance. Further empirical
work should take advantage of longer-term data, exploring whether the re-
sults of pre-1960 democratic reforms corroborate those of post-1960 reforms.
More generally, building a bridge between the recent work in political eco-
nomics and development economics, may teach us important lessons about
growth-enhancing institutional reforms.
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24Data Appendix
Variables are assembled for all independent countries on an annual basis
during the period 1960 to 2000, whenever available. Unless stated otherwise,
the panel data set just collects the annual observations for each country,
while the cross-sectional data set collects their average values in the 1990s
for each country.
Economic performance
GDP per capita: Log of real GDP per capita. Source: Penn World Tables
6.1
Output per worker: As in Hall and Jones (1999), (the log of ) GDP divided
by the workforce. Source: Penn World Tables 6.1.
TFP: Log of total factor prodcutivity. Constructed as in Hall and Jones
(1999), by adjusting (the log of) output per worker for physical capital (con-
structed from investment data by perpetual inventory method and imposing
common depreciation and capital shares) and human capital (years of school-
ing in the population above 25, interpolating between 5-year observations).
Sources: Penn World Tables 6.1 and Barro-Lee data set.
Economic policy
GADP: Average of ﬁve diﬀerent subjective perception indexes concerning
(i) repudiation of government contracts, (ii) expropriation risk, (iii) corrup-
tion, (iv) rule of law, and (v) bureaucratic quality. Normalized between 0
and 1. Source: IRIS-3 data set.
Open: Binary (0,1) indicator for openness of the economy in a given year.
Coded open only if all of Sachs and Warner’s (1995) ﬁve criteria are fulﬁlled,
namely (i) average tariﬀs below 40%, (ii) non-tariﬀ b a r r i e r si nl e s st h a n4 0 %
of sectors, (iii) black market premium of the exchange rate less than 20%, (iv)
no state monopoly on major exports, (v) socialist economic system. Sources:
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) and Wacziarg and Welch (2004).
Years open:A v e r a g eo fopen during 1950-1998.
Structural policy: in the panel data set this is an unweighted average of
GADP and open, year by year; in the cross-sectional data set it is unweighted
average of years open and the 1990s average of GADP.
Government consumption: total government consumption as a percentage
of GDP. Source: Penn World Tables 6.1
25Forms of democracy and political institutions
Democracy: Binary (0,1) indicator of democratic rule.
In the cross-sectional data set, democracy =1 requires an average value
in the 1990s less than 5 of the Gastil index. This is an average of indexes
for civil liberties and political rights, where each index is measured on one-
to-seven scale with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven
the lowest. Countries with scores between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated ”free”,
between 3.0 and 5.5 ”partly free” and between 5.5 and 7.0 ”not free”. Source:
Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings.
In the panel data set, democracy =1 in a given year requires a (strictly)
positive value of the Polity2 index. This index adds a number of indicators
regarding the selection of and checks and balances on the executive, and
the openness and competitiveness of elections; it ranges from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Source: Polity IV Project
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm).
Age of democracy:D e ﬁned (in the cross section) as age of democracy
= (2000 − dem_age)/200, where dem_age is the ﬁrst year of democratic
rule, corresponding to the ﬁrst year of an uninterrupted string of positive
yearly values of the Polity2 index until the end of the sample, given that the
country was also an independent nation (foreign occupation during WWII
not counted as an interruption of democracy). Sources: PolityIV Project
and Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Parliamentary democracy: Binary indicator of parliamentary form of gov-
ernment among countries with democracy =1 .C o d e da s1i ft h ec o n ﬁdence
of the legislative assembly is necessary for the survival of the executive (even
if an elected president is chief executive). Source: Persson and Tabellini
(2003).
Presidential democracy: Binary indicator for presidential form of gov-
ernment. Coded as 1 if democracy =1a n dparliamentary democracy =0 .
Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Proportional democracy: Binary indicator of proportional elections among
countries with democracy =1. Coded as 1 if the legislative assembly (lower
house) is not elected with plurality or majority rule. Source: Persson and
Tabellini (2003).
Majoritarian democracy: Binary indicator for majoritarian elections. Coded
as 1 if democracy =1 a n dproportional democracy = 0. Source: Persson and
Tabellini (2003).
26Permanent democracy: Binary indicator (in the panel only) for a year
that belongs to a democratic spell (democracy = 1) beginning strictly after
1960 (or strictly after the date of independence, if after 1960) and continuing
without interruption until 2000.
Temporary democracy: Binary indicator (in the panel only) for a year
that belongs to a democratic spell ending before 2000.
Constitutional birth 1921-50 and 1951-80: Binary indicators (cross sec-
tion only) for the age of the current constitution among democracies. Coded
as 1 if democracy = 1 and the present electoral system or form of govern-
ment was established in the periods between 1921 and 1950, or 1951 and
1980, respectively. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Other country characteristics
Continental location: Binary indicators for (East) Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Used directly in the cross-sectional speciﬁcations and interacted
with year dummies in the panel speciﬁcations.
Colonial origin: Binary indicators for British, French Spanish-Portuguese,
and Other colonizers. In cross-sectional speciﬁcations, these binary indica-
tors are discounted by the factor (250 — years since independence)/250. In the
panel speciﬁcations they are interacted with year dummies. Source: Persson
and Tabellini (2003)
Socialist legal origin: Binary indicator for socialist legal origin, interacted
with year dummies in some of the panel speciﬁcations. Source: La Porta et
al (1998).
Share of European speakers: The fraction of the population (in the cross-
section only) speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: En-
glish, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Hall and Jones
(1999).
Predicted trade share: Log of the Frankel-Romer forecasted trade share
(in the cross-section only), derived from a gravity model of international trade
that only takes into account country population and geographical features.
Source: Hall and Jones (1999)
Settler mortality: Log of mortality rate among non-military settlers in
Western European colonies in the early 1800s. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001).
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Out (N=20)Table 1  History, structural policy and economic performance  
 
 
Cross section   Full data set     Settler mortality data set           
Dependent variable   structural 
policy 
output per 
worker 
  structural 
  policy 
output per 
worker 
structural 
policy 
output per 
worker 
          
       
      
    
  
structural policy    3.81***
(0.66) 
 
 
 5.17*** 
(1.06) 
9.00***
(2.57) 
European speakers    0.21*** 
 (0.06) 
     0.33*** 
  (0.09) 
predicted trade share      0.09*** 
 (0.03) 
     0.05 
  (0.04) 
settler mortality          
 
–0.06**   
 (0.02) 
Excluded instruments  F   11.01***       6.82***      5.98**   
Over-identification  chi-2 (df)     2.39(1)      0.61(1)        
Number of observations    98   98      58    58    59   59 
 
Instrumental variable estimation by GMM, allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form.  
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10%.  
Second stage includes structural policy (endogenous) and indicators for earlier colonial powers (Britain, France, Spain-Portugal, Other) and continents (Latin Am., 
Africa, Asia). First stage includes the same seven indicators, and instruments as shown in cols 1, 3 and 5. 
Excluded instruments F  is the test statistic of the hypothesis that the instruments do not belong to the first-stage regression. 
Over-identification chi-2(df) is the Hansen J statistic of the over-identifying restriction that one of the instruments does not influence output per worker, other than  
through structural policy; critical value (cols 2 and 4) at 5%  is 3.84. Table 2   Forms of democracy, structural policy and economic performance     
 
 
Cross section   Full data set                                      Settler mortality data set     
Dependent variable   structural 
policy 
output per  
worker 
 
GDP per 
capita 
TFP 
          
 
   
   
   
   
     
structural  output per  
policy  worker 
 
GDP per 
capita 
TFP 
structural policy      3.59***   3.91*** 
(0.64)  (0.70) 
 1.88*** 
(0.39) 
    4.78*** 
 (0.86) 
 5.22*** 
(0.85) 
 2.05*** 
(0.56) 
parliamentary democracy    0.10** 
(0.05) 
        0.17** 
 (0.08) 
age of democracy      0.32*** 
(0.09) 
        0.34** 
 (0.15) 
European speakers    0.13** 
(0.06) 
        0.20* 
 (0.08) 
predicted trade share      0.08*** 
(0.02) 
        0.01 
 (0.03) 
Excluded instruments  F    10.50***      12.68***    5.88***      5.11** 
Over-identification chi-2(df)     0.68(2)  0.89(2)   1.34(2)       1.39(2) 1.64(2) 0.98(2)
Number of observations   97   97  97   86    57    57   57   48 
Instrumental variable estimation by GMM, allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10%.  
Second stage in cols 2-4 and 6-8  includes structural policy (endogenous) and indicators for earlier colonial powers (Britain, France, Spain-Portugal, Other) and 
continents (Latin Am., Africa, Asia).. First stage includes exogenous second-stage variables and instruments as shown in cols 1, and 4. 
Excluded instruments F is the test statistic of the hypothesis that the instruments do not belong to the first-stage regression. 
Over-identification chi-2(df) is the C statistic for the over-identifying restriction for the two constitutional instruments; critical value at 5% is 5.99.  Table 3  History,  forms of democracy and structural policy    
 
 
Dependent  variable   parliamentary  
democracy 
structural 
policy 
age of 
democracy 
structural 
policy 
parliamentary  
democracy 
age of 
democracy 
structural 
policy 
       
    
             
   
   
           
      
parliamentary democracy       0.31** 
(0.16) 
0.18**
(0.08) 
      0.49*** 
(0.19) 
age of democracy       0.38***
(0.14) 
0.64**
(0.30) 
–0.05
(0.25) 
settler mortality   –0.10** 
  (0.04) 
–0.05**
(0.02) 
     –0.08** 
   (0.04) 
–0.04* 
 (0.02) 
 
constitutional birth  51-80     0.25** 
  (0.11) 
  0.15***
(0.06) 
      0.23** 
    (0.11) 
 0.07 
(0.05) 
 
constitutional birth  21-50  –0.26
    (0.17) 
 0.26*** 
(0.09) 
 
Excluded instruments F     4.75**     4.73**        2.96**   5.61***   
Over-identification chi-2(df)       0.31(1)     0.58(1)       0.03(1) 
Number of observations   57   57   57   57       57   57   57 
Instrumental variable estimation by GMM, allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10%.  
Second stage in cols 2, 4 and 7  includes structural policy (endogenous) and indicators for earlier colonial powers (Britain, France, Spain-Portugal, Other) and 
continents (Latin Am., Africa, Asia) plus European speakers and predicted trade share . First stage includes exogenous second-stage variables and instruments as shown 
in cols 1, 3, 5 and 6. Excluded instruments F is the test statistic of the hypothesis that the instruments do not belong to the first-stage regression. 
Over-identification chi-2(df) is the J statistic for the over-identifying restriction that settler mortality affects structural policy only through the form of democracy;
  critical value at 5% is 3.84 .   Table 4   Reform episodes 1962-1998 
 
(a) Reforms in existing democracies 
 
 
Country  Reform   Type of  reform 
   
Albania 1992  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Armenia 1995  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Cyprus  1970  Government: parliamentary to presidential 
Cyprus 1970  Elections:  proportional to majoritarian 
Cyprus 1981  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Fiji 1994  Elections:  proportional to majoritarian 
France 1986  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
France 1988  Elections:  proportional to majoritarian 
Japan 1994  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Macedonia 1998  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Moldova 1993  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
New Zealand  1996  Elections: majoritarian to proportional 
Philippines 1998  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
South Africa  1994  Elections: majoritarian to proportional 
Sri Lanka  1978  Elections: majoritarian to proportional 
Sri Lanka  1978  Government: parliamentary to presidential 
Ukraine 1998  Elections:  majoritarian to proportional 
Zimbabwe 1985  Elections:  proportional to majoritarian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        (b) Exits and entries in different forms of democracy   
 
Country   Year  Entry  
or exit 
Form of 
government 
Form of 
 elections 
        
Albania 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Albania 1996  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Albania 1997  entry  Parliamentary Proportional 
Argentina 1973  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Argentina 1976  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Argentina 1983  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Armenia 1996  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Armenia 1998  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Azerbaijan 1993  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Bangladesh 1974  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Bangladesh 1991  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Belarus 1995  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Benin 1963  exit     
Benin 1991  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Bolivia 1982  entry  Presidential  Proportional 
Brazil 1964  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Brazil 1985  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Bulgaria 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Burkina Faso  1977  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Burkina Faso  1980  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Cambodia 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Cambodia 1997  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Cambodia 1998  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Central African Rep.  1993  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Chile 1973  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Chile 1989  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Comoros 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Comoros 1995  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Comoros 1996  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Cyprus 1963  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Cyprus 1968  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Dominican Republic  1962  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Dominican Republic  1964  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Dominican Republic  1978  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Ecuador 1968  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Ecuador 1970  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Ecuador 1979  entry  Presidential Proportional 
El Salvador  1982  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Ethiopia 1993  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Fiji 1987  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Fiji 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Gambia 1994  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1970  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1972  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1979  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian Ghana 1981  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Ghana 1996  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Greece 1967  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Greece 1974  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Guatemala 1966  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Guatemala 1974  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Guatemala 1986  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Guinea-Bissau 1994  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Guinea-Bissau 1998  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Guyana 1978  exit  Presidential Proportional 
Guyana 1992  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Haiti 1990  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Haiti 1991  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Haiti 1994  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Honduras 1980  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Hungary 1989  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Iran 1997  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Kenya 1966  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Lebanon 1975  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Lesotho 1970  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Lesotho 1993  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Lesotho 1998  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Madagascar 1991  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Malawi 1994  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Mali 1992  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Mexico 1994  entry  Presidential  Proportional 
Mongolia 1990  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Mozambique 1994  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Myanmar (Burma)  1962  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Nepal 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Nicaragua 1990  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Niger 1991  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Niger 1996  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Nigeria 1966  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Nigeria 1979  entry  Presidential Majoritarian 
Nigeria 1984  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1962  entry  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1970  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1972  entry  Presidential Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1977  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Pakistan 1988  entry  Presidential Majoritarian 
Panama 1968  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Panama 1989  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Paraguay 1989  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Peru 1968  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Peru 1979  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Peru 1992  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Peru 1993  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Philippines 1972  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Philippines 1986  entry  Presidential Majoritarian 
Poland 1989  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian Portugal 1975  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Romania 1990  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Sierra Leone  1967  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Sierra Leone  1968  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Sierra Leone  1971  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Sierra Leone  1996  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Sierra Leone  1997  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Somalia 1969  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
South Korea  1963  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
South Korea  1972  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
South Korea  1987  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Spain 1976  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Sudan 1965  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1970  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1986  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Sudan 1989  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Taiwan 1992  entry  Presidential Proportional 
Thailand 1969  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1971  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1974  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1976  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1978  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1991  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Thailand 1992  entry  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Turkey 1971  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1973  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1980  exit  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Turkey 1983  entry  Parliamentary  Proportional 
Uganda 1966  exit  Parliamentary  Majoritarian 
Uganda 1980  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Uganda 1985  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Uruguay 1972  exit  Presidential  Proportional 
Uruguay 1985  entry  Presidential  Proportional 
Zambia 1968  exit  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Zambia 1991  entry  Presidential  Majoritarian 
Zimbabwe 1987  exit  Presidential Majoritarian 
 Table 5   Reform episodes under different forms of democracy    
 
 
                       
         
           
           
             
All  Parliamentary
 
 Presidential Proportional Majoritarian Permanent Temporary
Reform < 1981   0.46 
 
0.56 0.39
 
0.43 
 
0.48 0.16 0.65
Latin America 
  
0.27 0 0.44 0.43 0.09 0.32
 
0.23 
Africa 
  
0.35 0.35 0.34 0.18 0.52 0.26
 
0.40 
 
Asia  0.17 0.23 0.14 0.07 0.28 0.12 0.21
Number  of observations  132  52  79  67  64  50  82 
 
Entries in the table are based on years in which countries enter or exit from state of democracy (i.e., Polity2 index turns from non-positive to strictly positive).. 
Columns show the average of country characteristics of such reform episodes, cross-tabulated by forms of democracy, defined as in the text.   Table 6  Democratic reforms and openness 1960-2000 in 132 countries    
 
    parliamentary   0.184 
(0.024)*** 
[0.076]** 
 0.264 
(0.024)*** 
[0.092]*** 
      
      
       
     
    
      
              
           
presidential      0.080 
(0.017)*** 
[0.056] 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
[0.060] 
proportional    
 
0.192
(0.018)*** 
[0.060]*** 
 0.153 
(0.019)*** 
[0.067]** 
majoritarian 
    
 -0.004 
(0.021) 
[0.065] 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
[0.078] 
permanent 
      
 0.225 
(0.017)*** 
{0.064}*** 
 0.190 
(0.019)*** 
[0.074]** 
temporary 
 
-0.051
(0.020)** 
[0.049] 
-0.056 
(0.020)*** 
[0.054] 
3 years before 
reform type #1 
-0.006
(0.036) 
[0.048] 
0.030
(0.025) 
[0.051] 
0.055
(0.024)** 
[0.051] 
3 years before  
reform type #2  
 
-0.014
(0.023) 
[0.052] 
-0.042
(0.031) 
[0.062] 
-0.058
(0.033)* 
[0.058] 
Continent-year dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes   No    Yes 
Number of observations   4549  4549   4549  4549  4549   4549 
All regressions include fixed year and country effects. Interacted indicators for years and continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America) included as indicated. 
Standard errors in parenthesis conventional, in square brackets clustered (by country) ; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10%. 
3 years before reform type #1 (#2) refers to an indicator for the three years preceding the first (second) type of reform in the same column.  Table 7  Democratic reforms, property rights and structural policy 1982-1997 in 113 countries    
 
 
    Dependent variable   GADP         Structural 
policy 
   
       
       
         
         
        
               
parliamentary   0.058 
(0.015)*** 
[0.040] 
 0.047 
(0.017)** 
[0.042] 
  0.220
(0.030)*** 
[0.061]*** 
 0.270 
(0.034)*** 
[0.079]*** 
presidential      0.004 
(0.008) 
[0.017] 
0.004 
(0.010) 
[0.019] 
  0.066
(0.017)*** 
[0.041] 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
[0.043] 
proportional    
 
0.017   0.010 
(0.009)* 
[0.026] 
(0.011) 
[0.027] 
0.163
(0.019)*** 
[0.049]*** 
 0.130 
(0.022)*** 
[0.058]** 
majoritarian 
    
 0.013 
(0.011) 
[0.014] 
 0.019 
(0.012) 
[0.018] 
0.010
(0.022) 
[0.046] 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
[0.058] 
3 years before 
reform type #1 
    -0.030 
 (0.019) 
 [0.034] 
-0.013
(0.012) 
[0.011] 
     -0.022 
(0.036) 
[0.057] 
  0.005 
 (0.023) 
 [0.036] 
 
3 years before  
reform type #2  
 
0.006
(0.010) 
[0.018] 
0.011
(0.013) 
[0.031] 
-0.038
 (0.020)* 
 [0.033] 
-0.059
(0.026)** 
[0.047] 
Continent-year dummies    No   Yes    No     Yes         No    Yes   No    Yes 
Number of observations   1505  1505  1505  1505  1255  1255  1255  1255 
 
All regressions include fixed year and country effects. Interacted indicators for years and continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America) included as indicated. 
Standard errors in parenthesis conventional, in square brackets clustered (by country) ; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10%. 
3 years before reform type #1 (#2) refers to an indicator for the three years preceding the first (second) type of reform in the same column. Table 8  Democratic reforms and output per worker  1960-2000 in 135 countries    
 
    parliamentary   0.154 
(0.021)*** 
[0.047]*** 
 0.049 
(0.020)** 
[0.045] 
      
      
       
     
    
        
              
           
presidential      -0.053 
(0.015)*** 
[0.054] 
 -0.006 
(0.014) 
[0.048] 
proportional    
 
0.016
(0.016) 
[0.062] 
 0.042 
(0.015)*** 
[0.051] 
majoritarian 
    
 0.001 
(0.018) 
[0.068] 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
[0.053] 
permanent 
      
-0.010 
(0.015) 
[0.061] 
- 0.019 
(0.015) 
[0.056] 
temporary 
 
0.042
(0.017)** 
[0.051] 
 0.042 
(0.015)*** 
[0.042] 
3 years before 
reform type #1 
0.053
(0.029)* 
[0.039] 
-0.008
(0.020) 
[0.038] 
-0.053
(0.019)*** 
[0.036] 
3 years before  
reform type #2  
 
-0.066
(0.018)*** 
[0.036]* 
-0.057
(0.023)** 
[0.044] 
-0.007
(0.025) 
[0.044] 
Continent-year dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes   No    Yes 
Number of observations   4320  4320   4320  4320  4320   4320 
All regressions include fixed year and country effects. Interacted indicators for years and continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America) , as well as for years and socialist 
legal origin, included as indicated. 
Standard errors in parenthesis conventional, in square brackets clustered (by country) ; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10% . 
3 years before reform type #1 (#2) refers to an indicator for the three years preceding the first (second) type of reform in the same column. Table 9  Democratic reforms and government consumption  1960-2000 in 137 countries    
 
    parliamentary   1.320 
(0.494)*** 
[0.916] 
 2.332 
(0.522)*** 
[1.174]** 
      
      
       
     
    
      
             
           
presidential      -0.120 
(0.339) 
[0.860] 
 -0.984 
(0.378)*** 
[1.041] 
proportional    
 
0.646
(0.360)* 
[0.705] 
 0.417 
(0.401) 
[0.820] 
majoritarian 
    
 -0.149 
(0.418) 
[1.308] 
 -0.212 
(0.431) 
[1.465] 
permanent 
      
 0.653 
(0.355)* 
[0.951] 
 0.433 
(0.402) 
[1.260] 
temporary 
 
-0.223
(0.397) 
[0.751] 
-0.271 
(0.406) 
[0.835] 
3 years before 
reform type #1 
-0.068
(0.738) 
[0.884] 
-0.025
(0.529) 
[0.826] 
-0.140
(0.501) 
[0.932] 
3 years before  
reform type #2  
 
-0.277
(0.491) 
[0.853] 
-0.381
(0.635) 
[0.973] 
-0.154
(0.685) 
[0.883] 
Continent-year dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes   No    Yes 
Number of observations   4460  4460   4460  4460  4460   4460 
All regressions include fixed year and country effects. Interacted indicators for years and continents (Africa, Asia, Latin America) included as indicated. 
Standard errors in parenthesis conventional, in square brackets clustered (by country); *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *  significant at 10% . 
3 years before reform type #1 (#2) refers to an indicator for the three years preceding the first (second) type of reform in the same column. 
 